I Demand a Reciept for My Electronic Vote!

[wolfwings]

Now... many will misunderstand what I mean by posting to this image, and what the shorthand form of the request meant.

This isn't a lashing-out at Diebold, or any of the other, numerous, electronic-voting systems.

This isn't a request that my vote suddenly be trackable.

This is a demand that, if I place a vote with an electronic voting machine, I recieve a reciept that has a single fact it can prove:
What the votes cast for it are.

I don't need to be able to prove who cast the votes on the reciept (though what machine they were cast at could be useful to prevent double-voting attacks), only that the votes on the reciept are valid votes, and what those votes were, both in cleartext and in some form of durable, secure, provable fashion. The latter would likely involve encrypted data using public-key information, to prove that the reciept is valid as a side-effect.

Comments

The issues...

[aerowolf.livejournal.com]

There are a few issues with this:

1) Vote-selling. If you receive a receipt, and remove it from the polling place, it becomes possible to sell that proof to someone -- to prove that you did vote for the person they wanted you to vote for.

2) If voters remove their receipts from the polling place, there's no way to reach all the voters who voted and get all their receipts in the event of a discrepancy.

The idea that I think would work best: vote, have the machine print a receipt, look at it to make sure that your votes got cast correctly, then put the receipt in a receptacle that scans it as it comes in, into another database.

Have it print out something like driver's license 2d barcodes on the receipt, as well as the calculation formula for the number to be verified. (Post the calculation formula in the polling place, separately, as well.) Scan in the text on the receipt and determine if the numbers next to them are correct as a tertiary line of defense against the machine printing one text but printing out another barcode.

(i.e., 'do not trust the voting machine'.)

A paper receipt would give the auditors something to effectively audit, the way they have now -- which is something that the current receiptless electronic system does not offer. They place /all/ of their trust in the machine, which is inappropriate at best and dangerous at worst.

What you bring up is a very valid point.

[wolfwings.livejournal.com]

And one I should have clarified sooner. I don't want to be able to take my 'vote' home and pin it on the wall. Honestly, I just want a physical, verifiable copy of my vote, to prove there's SOME record of my vote that's visible to the nakey eye. I don't plan to take it anywhere, or at least not the 'only copy' of the vote.

Though against vote-selling... since the votes don't prove who cast them, what's to stop someone from just swapping ballots with someone else to 'prove' how they voted, and swindling the so-called 'purchaser' out of cash? Yeah, you can strongarm someone, but the rubber-hose technique is rather hard to stop even without vote confirmation slips.